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TC HEARTLAND, A LEGALLY WRONG
PAINKILLER FOR THE FORUM
SHOPPING PROBLEM
XINCHENG MA*
INTRODUCTION
Many commentators applauded the TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
Group Brands LLC and In re Cray cases for successfully driving patent
owners away from the Eastern District of Texas. 1 However, this Article
criticizes these two cases for being contrary to both the text and the
legislative history of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) and cautions that, for the sake
of prudence, the Supreme Court should not change the venue requirement as
drastically as TC Heartland.
This Article further argues that the differences in district courts’ local
patent rules, instead of the liberalized venue requirement as suggested by
many scholars, 2 is the real culprit responsible for the forum shopping
phenomenon at the Eastern District of Texas. A more restrictive venue
requirement cannot fix the forum shopping problem so long as district courts
can still adopt their own special procedures for patent cases. This Article

* Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. expected 2019; Nanjing University, B.S. in Physics
2016. ©2019, Xincheng Ma. The Author wants to thank John Thomas, his patent law professor at
Georgetown Law, for his unreserved guidance and advice throughout the writing process, and Guiying
Ji, for her unconditioned support. Furthermore, the Author appreciates the editing suggestions from
editors at the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property, especially Mary E. LaFleur, Michael Brew,
and Brittany Kaplan. Without them, this paper would not have been as good as it is now.
1. Alyssa Miller, Attorneys React to Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017,
8:52 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patentvenue-ruling.
2. Alex Chan, Patentee Forum Shopping May Be About To Change, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2016, 9:38
PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/746615/patentee-forum-shopping-may-be-about-to-change;
Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Urged To Close ‘Absurd’ East Texas Patent Docket, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2015,
8:05 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/721246/fed-circ-urged-to-close-absurd-east-texaspatent-docket; Jimmy Hoover, Fed. Circ. Judge Wary Of Reshaping Patent Suit Venue Rules, LAW360
(Mar. 11, 2016, 7:53 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/747316/fed-circ-judge-wary-ofreshaping-patent-suit-venue-rules.
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proposes to enact Federal Rules of Patent Procedure to uproot the real cause
of forum shopping.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes
the development of the general venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and the
patent venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the already failed venue reform
bills, the Supreme Court’s opinion in TC Heartland, and the Federal
Circuit’s opinion in Cray. Part II argues the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit’s interpretations of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) are contrary to both the
text and the legislative history of the statute. Parts III and IV argue that the
Court should be cautious in taking steps as drastic as TC Heartland when
more lenient venue bills failed at Congress and when Congress has
continuously liberalized general venue requirements in the past seventy
years. Part V argues that a more restrictive venue requirement cannot fix the
forum shopping problem and enacting Federal Rules of Patent Procedure is
a more direct measure.
I. THE HISTORY OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(C) & 1400(B)
A. Enactment, Revisions, and Judicial Interpretations
In 1789, Congress enacted the first general venue statute, the
predecessor of § 1391(c), under which venue was proper in any judicial
district where defendants inhabited or where defendants “shall be found.”3
In 1887, Congress narrowed this general venue statute by deleting the “shall
be found” option, leaving only the “inhabit” option for plaintiffs.4 At that
time, where corporate defendants“ “inhabit” meant “the states in which they
were “incorporated.”5
In 1897, Congress passed the first patent venue statute, the predecessor
of § 1400(b).6 Under this statute, patent owners could bring claims in any
judicial districts where (1) defendants inhabit or (2) where defendants
committed infringement and had their “regular and established place of
business.”7 Because of the “regular and established place of business” prong,
this patent statute provided more options to patent plaintiffs than the 1887
general statute provided to general plaintiffs. At the same time, because
3. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(2011)).
4. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)).
5. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2017).
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, 695–96 (1897) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
(2019)).
7. Id. at 695.
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defendants can “be found” in any district where they have a “regular and
established place of business,” this patent statute was narrower than the 1789
general statute. At the time, a corporation was still understood to “inhabit”
only the state in which it was incorporated.8
In 1948, Congress re-codified the general venue statute into 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) and the § 1400(b)’s predecessor into 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 9 It
replaced the term “inhabit” with the term “reside” in both of the two venue
statutes.10 At the same time, § 1391(c) defined the term “residence” as “any
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is
doing business.”11 For the first time, the question arose as to whether the
definition of “residence” in § 1391(c) supplemented the meaning of “reside”
in § 1400(b), which did not define the term by itself. In Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp., the Supreme Court held that it did not.12 As a
result, the term “reside” in § 1400(b) still means “where the corporation is
incorporated,” as the term “inhabit” used to mean before the simultaneous
recodification. 13 Since then, Congress has not revised the language of §
1400(b) again.
Unlike § 1400(b), § 1391(c) has been amended several times after 1948.
One major relevant change happened in 1988. 14 After being amended, §
1391(c) provided that “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced.”15 Because of the language “for purposes of venue under this
chapter,” the Federal Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas
Appliance Co. that Congress finally intended the definition of “reside” in §
1391(c) to control the meaning of “reside” in § 1400(b).16 After all, § 1391(c)
8. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1892).
9. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)).
10. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)), and Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)), with Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)), and Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)).
11. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)).
12. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957).
13. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017).
14. Id.
15. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4642,
4669 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)) (emphasis added).
16. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21.
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and § 1400(b) were under the same chapter. 17 In terms of effect, patent
plaintiffs finally got the same extent of freedom in choosing where to file
their claims as other civil plaintiffs did: wherever the courts have personal
jurisdiction over defendants.18 After VE Holding, the last legislative change
made to § 1391(c) happened in 2011.19 Congress added the language that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” (called “saving clause” by the
Supreme Court) “this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions
brought in district courts of the United States,” and deleted the phrase “under
this chapter.”20
Currently, § 1391(c) reads as:
For all venue purposes . . . an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued
in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated,
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which
such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to the civil action in question . . .21

and § 1400(b) reads as: “Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides (‘first prong’), or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business (‘second prong’).”22
B. Venue Reform Bills Failed at Congress
Many scholars blame VE Holding for liberalizing the venue
requirement for patent owners, thereby enabling them to forum shop.23 They
argue that the freedom of choice for patent owners resulted in an uncommon
concentration of filing in a single district court—the Eastern District of
Texas.24 From January to June 2016, 36.4 percent of patent infringement
cases were filed at the Eastern District of Texas, almost three times more
than the number of cases filed in the second most popular venue, the District
of Delaware.25
17. Id. at 1578.
18. See id. at 1583.
19. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520.
20. Id.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999).
23. See, e.g., Robert M. Parker, The Eastern District Phenomenon, 45 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 27, 28
(2008).
24. Id.
25. Owen Byrd, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update/.
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At the same time, frequent defendants like Samsung, Apple, and other
high-tech companies kept lobbying Congress for a more restrictive patent
venue statute.26 Numerous bills about venue reform were introduced to both
the House and the Senate to restrict patent venue. Each failed. On June 8,
2005, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas introduced the Patent Reform
Act of 2005 (“House Bill 2795”). This original Bill did not contain any venue
provision,27 but an amendment to the bill would have limited patent venue to
(1) districts in which the defendant had its principal place of business, (2)
districts in which acts of infringement occurred, and the defendant had an
regular and established place of business, or (3) districts in which personal
jurisdiction is proper if the patent owner is a not-for-profit educational
institution.28 On August 3, 2006, Senator Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy
further introduced Senate Bill 3818, or Patent Reform Act of 2006, which
corresponds to the House Bill, and it would have limited patent venue to (1)
districts in which the plaintiff or defendant has principal place of business or
is incorporated, or (2) districts in which acts of infringement occurred, and
the defendant had an regular and established place of business.29 “The intent
of the venue language is to serve as a starting point for discussions as to what
restrictions— . . . if any— . . . are appropriate on the venue in which patent
cases may be brought,” stated Senator Hatch (for himself and Senator
Leahy). 30 Ultimately, Congress did not pass these proposed reform bills,
since some Senators believed the added amendment about venue was too
restrictive.
In the meantime, on April 5, 2006, Representative Howard Berman
introduced House Bill 5096, or the Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006,
which adds to the current patent venue statute a “transfer” provision.31 Under
the “transfer” provision of that bill, if an infringement case is not filed in (1)
districts in which patentee resides or maintains its principal place of business
or (2) districts in which accused infringer has principal place of business or
26. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 11–12 (2017)
(statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University).
27. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (as introduced in the House, June 8, 2005).
28. Lamar Smith, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 § 9, at 56–57,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/AmendedSmithBill.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2019), see also
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, The “Patent Act of 2005”: Hearing on H.R. 2795
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 1–3 (2005) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Prop.).
29. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Aug. 3,
2006).
30. 152 CONG. REC. 16,998 (2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
31. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 7 (2006).
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is incorporated, and if neither plaintiff nor defendant has substantial evidence
and witness in the original judicial district, the defendant can transfer the
case to another judicial district where substantial witness and evidence
exist.32 This bill also failed.
On April 18, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Howard
Berman of California introduced Patent Reform Act of 2007, which included
a patent venue provision nearly identical to the Senate Bill 3818.33 Under
this Bill, as introduced in the Senate and the House, patent venue would have
been proper in (1) judicial district where the defendant has principal place of
business or is incorporated, and (2) judicial district where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.34
On July 12, 2007, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania proposed an
amendment to this bill which further requires that defendant has committed
“substantial” infringement and “regular and established” physical facility
which constitute “substantial” operation for defendant in the judicial district
under the second prong.35 This amendment resulted in severe rebound from
legislators sided with patent owners. When the Bill finally got reported to
the Senate and the House, the bill ended up with more provisions favoring
patent owners. For example, under the final Senate Bill as reported in the
Senate, patent venue was proper only at the judicial districts where (1) the
defendant, or for foreign defendant, the primary U.S. subsidiary has its
principal place of business or is incorporated; (2) the defendant has
“committed substantial acts of infringement” and has a “regular and
established” physical facility that constitutes a “substantial” portion of
defendant’s operations; (3) the plaintiff resides if the plaintiff is an institute
of higher learning or a non-profit organization serving as patent licensing
for such institute, or (4) the plaintiff resides if the plaintiff is an individual
inventor who is a natural person.36 This amendment provided one of the
most convenient venues for universities and individual inventors, usually on
the plaintiff’s side. Nevertheless, this amendment also failed. Representative
32. Id.
33. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 18,
2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the House, Apr. 18,
2007).
34. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 18,
2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (as introduced in the House, Apr. 18,
2007).
35. See Michael C. Smith, “A Battle Over Where the War Is to Be Fought”: Venue in Patent Cases,
The Advocate 10, 11 (2007).
36. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24,
2008).
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Zoe Lofgren of California, Representative Chris Cannon of Utah, and other
legislators forcefully criticized the local procedural rules of the Eastern
District of Texas and argued how this more restrictive venue reform bill
could solve patent troll problem. However, opponents including Senator
John Cornyn of Texas and Representative Louie Gohmert of Texas defeated
this bill, pointing out that the Eastern District of Texas already gained
valuable experience and expertise in patent litigation.37
On March 3, 2009, Senator Leahy introduced the Patent Reform Act of
2009 (“Senate Bill 515”) in the Senate.38 This bill is similar to the Patent
Reform Act of 2007 as reported in Senate and also contains a “transfer”
provision similar to the one in Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006.39
Different from the provision in Patent Depend on Quality Act of 2006,
however, this “transfer” provision allows transfer even when cases are
originally filed in proper district court.40 This bill also did not survive.
Before the enactment of the American Invents Act (“AIA”), Congress
deleted the provision of the bill pertaining to venue. That provision, if
adopted, would have required a court to transfer a case upon a showing that
the transferee district is clearly more convenient.41 Because Senators feared
that this controversial provision would endanger the agreement they had
reached, it did not appear in the final AIA.42
The last legislative effort prior to TC Heartland and Cray was the
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016 (“VENUE Act
of 2016”). This amendment of § 1400(b) would have allowed a patent
infringement case to be brought in only judicial districts where:
(1) the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated; (2)
the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit and
has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of
infringement; (3) the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued; (4) an
inventor named on the patent conducted research or development that led
to the application for the patent in suit; or (5) a party has a regular and
established physical facility and has managed significant research and
development for the invention claimed in the patent, has manufactured a
tangible product alleged to embody that invention, or has implemented a
37. See 153 CONG. REC. 23, 935–36 (2007) (statement of Rep. Gohmert); Cornyn Pledges to Fight
for Fairness for Eastern District of Texas Courts, JOHN CORNYN U.S. SEN. FOR TEX. (July 13, 2007),
https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/content/cornyn-pledges-fight-fairness-eastern-district-texas-courts.
38. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 19 (2009) (describing provisions of the Leahy-Specter-Feinstein
amendment).
42. See 157 CONG. REC. 2,997 (2011).
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manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the process is alleged
to embody the invention. 43

Some commentators believed this VENUE Act was more narrowly
tailored to the Eastern District of Texas problem because it only limited
patent owners’ venue options slightly.44 At the same time, law professors
criticized this Act for only relocating patent cases from plaintiff-friendly
forum to defendant-friendly forums.45 Regardless, this bill failed too.
C. TC Heartland and Cray
Finally, in TC Heartland, the Supreme Court gave the defendant
lobbyists what they wanted.46 On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued
its landmark opinion in TC Heartland. This opinion reaffirmed its previous
interpretation of the meaning of “reside” in § 1400(b) and rejected the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation in VE Holding, which had been left intact for
almost thirty years. 47 This reaffirmed interpretation limited proper venue
under the first prong of § 1400(b) from wherever personal jurisdiction can
be met back to judicial districts where the corporate defendants are
incorporated.48
The Supreme Court held that those amendments made to § 1391(c)
during the intervening 70 years meant nothing for § 1400(b). 49 In patent
cases, venue is still only proper at the judicial district where the defendant is
incorporated, how it was in 1948. 50 Justice Thomas justified this holding
under the canon that “when Congress intends to effect a change of that kind
[overturn a Supreme Court interpretation], it ordinarily provides a relatively

43. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
44. Andrew Williams, The VENUE Act—A Last-Ditch Attempt at Patent Reform?, PATENT DOCS
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/03/the-venue-act-a-last-ditch-attempt-at-patentreform.html.
45. See Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging Caution on the VENUE
Act (Aug. 1, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816062 (“The reality is that the major proponents of
changing the venue rules are primarily large high-tech companies and retailers with an online presence
sued in the Eastern District of Texas that would rather litigate in a small number of more defendantfriendly jurisdictions.”).
46. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 811 (2017)
(statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University) (“TC
Heartland is merely one tactical engagement in wide-ranging lobbying.”).
47. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017).
48. Compare id. with VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
49. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520.
50. Id.
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clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provision.”51 He also
rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in the lower proceeding that the
current phrase “for all venue purposes” was intended to cover more than the
old phrase “for venue purpose” in 1988. 52 Finally, he strengthened his
argument by pointing to the “saving clause” added in the 2011 revision:
“except as otherwise provided by law” and to Congress’ deletion of the
language “under this chapter.”53 According to Justice Thomas, this indicated
that Congress did not want to overturn Fourco.54
Three months later, the Federal Circuit issued a mandamus order in In
re Cray, which provided guidelines for lower courts to implement the
“regular and established place of business” prong of § 1400(b) (“the second
prong”).55 The second prong, as an alternative to the first prong addressed in
TC Heartland, provides that, in patent infringement cases, venue is also
proper in the judicial district where the defendant infringed and has “regular
and established place of business.”56 The Federal Circuit disassembled the
phrase “regular and established place of business” into three requirements:
(1) a physical place is necessary, in terms of “a building or part of building”
or “geographical location” in the district; (2) it must be a regular and
established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.57
Cray fulfilled the then urgent need of guidance: during the intervening thirty
years, there was no case discussing the second prong because the first prong
could be met whenever personal jurisdiction was proper under the
overturned VE Holding.58
In Cray, because both parties agreed that the defendant did not “reside”
in the judicial district, the Federal Circuit confined its inquiry to whether two
employees of the defendant and their homes located in a judicial district
could constitute a “regular and established place of business” under the
second prong.59 The Federal Circuit first referred to the legislative history of
the § 1400(b)’s predecessor and explained that the statute served the purpose
of resolving a district court split about whether the 1887 venue statute
applied to patent infringement cases or the 1789 statute applied. 60 After
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 1520–21.
Id. at 1521.
Id.
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999).
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360, 1364.
Id. at 1360–61.

TC HEARTLAND3. MA CKJIP FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

TC HEARTLAND, A LEGALLY WRONG PAINKILLER

5/30/2019 8:25 PM

373

citing a Supreme Court case Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., the
Federal Circuit concluded that the statute was intended to be a “restrictive
measure, limiting a prior broader venue (i.e., the 1887 statute),” and “[t]he
requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those
vague principles which, in the interests of some overriding policy, is to be
given a liberal construction.”61 “Be[ing] mindful of this history in applying
the statute,” Judge Lourie rejected Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor balancing test
and deconstructed the statute into three requirements: (1) a physical place is
necessary, in terms of “a building or part of building” or “geographical
location” in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of
business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.62
In reaching this statutory construction, Judge Lourie heavily relied on
The Century Dictionary.63 For example, although he “recognized that the
world has changed since 1985 . . . . In this new era, not all corporations
operate under a brick-and-mortar model,” he still insisted that the term
“place” independently requires “a physical place.”64 “[W]e must focus on the
full and unchanged language of the statute,” he said.65 Similarly, the term
“regular and established” requires a “settled and permanent” place of a
“steady and methodical” business.66 Finally, the meaning of “of defendant”
is self-evident: the defendant needs to have control over the place.67
D. The Effect of TC Heartland and Cray
In terms of driving plaintiffs away from the Eastern District of Texas,
TC Heartland and Cray have succeeded. Within the three-months before TC
Heartland, thirty-three percent of new patent infringement cases were filed
at the Eastern District of Texas, almost three times more than the number of
cases filed in the second most popular venue, the District of Delaware.68 In
the three months following TC Heartland, the percentage dropped to
thirteen.69 At the same time, the percentage of cases filed in the District of
Delaware went up to twenty-six percent from thirteen percent.70
61. Id. at 1361.
62. Id. at 1360–61.
63. Id. at 1362.
64. Id. at 1359, 1362.
65. Id. at 1359.
66. Id. at 1362–63.
67. Id. at 1363.
68. Owen Byrd, Patent Litigation Trends in the Three Months after T.C. Heartland, LEX MACHINA
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/patent-litigation-trends-in-the-three-months-after-t-c-heartland/.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Cray further limited judges’ discretion in finding proper venue under
the “regular and established place of business” prong by injecting the
“physical place” requirement into the inquiry. According to Docket
Navigator, between May 22, 2017 (TC Heartland) and September 21, 2017
(Cray), Judge Gilstrap denied all of two motions to transfer out from the
Eastern District of Texas or motions to dismiss for improper venue under the
“regular and established place” prong.71 In that period, the average denial
rate for such motions nationwide (excluding the Eastern District of Texas)
was two out of twenty-one (counting only court orders with final rulings on
such motions and magistrate judges’ recommendations on such motions).72
Since September 21, 2017, and up to March 29, 2017, Judge Gilstrap denied
three of six such motions.73 In the same period, the average denial rate for
71. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 799 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (order denying
defendant’s motion to transfer for improper venue); Kranos IP Corp. v. Riddell, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-443JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138108, *7–17 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017) (order denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue).
72. On the Docket Navigator platform, I searched for court orders under the legal issue “Regular
and Established Place of Business” entered by all U.S. District Courts, excluding the Eastern District of
Texas, between May 22, 2017 and September 21, 2017. I received the result of nineteen orders granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, sua sponte dismissal; two orders denying
such motion with prejudice; three orders denying such motion without prejudice or deferring ruling on
such motion for further briefing, further discovery, or possible amended complaint; four orders granting
the plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery or requesting additional briefing before ruling on
defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; and one order denying the plaintiff’s motion
for expedited discovery before ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue.
See compass.docketnavigator.com.
73. Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-cv-00980-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
193581, *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue);
SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00442-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, *1
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such motions nationwide (excluding the Eastern District of Texas) was seven
out of seventy-two (also counting only court orders with final rulings on such
motions and magistrate judges’ recommendations on such motions).74 This
data indicates that TC Heartland successfully drove cases from the Eastern
District of Texas to the District of Delaware and suggests that Cray, to some
extent, effectively limited district court judges’ discretion in the venue
determination under the second prong.
Before the completion of this Article, the Federal Circuit denied a
petition for mandamus from the defendant in the Eastern District of Texas in
In re Google LLC.75 In Google, the district court judge held that an Internet
server of the defendant could constitute a “physical presence” as required by
the Cray test, as opposed to a few other district court rulings.76 The Federal
Circuit panel denied the mandamus order because “a post-judgment appeal
generally is an adequate remedy” for venue concerns. 77 Predictably, the
result of this case on appeal will significantly affect the lasting outcome of
Cray and TC Heartland.

(E.D. Tex. July 19, 2018) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); Blitzsafe
Tex., LLC v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, No. 2:17-cv-00418-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173065,
*1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); Uniloc
USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00174-JRG, slip. op. (E.D. Tex. Dec. 06, 2017) (order granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue); AGIS Software Dev. LLC v. ZTE Corp. et al., No.
2-17-cv-00517, *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018) (order granting defendant’s dismiss for improper venue);
Fractus, SA v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00561-JRG, slip. op. (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018) (order granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue).
74. On the Docket Navigator platform, I searched for court orders under the legal issue “Regular
and Established Place of Business” entered by all U.S. District Courts, excluding the Eastern District of
Texas, between September 21, 2017 and March 29, 2019. I received the result of sixty-five orders granting
or recommending granting defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, or sua sponte
dismissal; seven orders denying or recommending denying such motion with prejudice; seven orders
denying such motion without prejudice or deferring ruling on such motion for further briefing, further
discovery or possible amended complaint; one order granting the defendant’s motion to transfer for
convenience and finding the transferee venue is proper; two orders denying the defendant’s motion to
transfer for convenience and finding the transferee venue improper; six orders granting the plaintiff’s
motion for expedited discovery or sua sponte requesting additional briefing before ruling on defendant’s
motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; zero orders denying the plaintiff’s motion for expedited
discovery before ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue; one order
denying plaintiff’s motion to retransfer for improper venue; one order granting plaintiff’s motion to add
new defendants because based on the amended complaint those newly-added defendants had a place of
business in the judicial district; and one order granting the defendant’s motion to amend its answer to
include a venue challenge. See compass.docketnavigator.com.
75. In re Google Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00442-JRG, 2018 WL 5536478, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2018).
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id. at *2.
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II. THE COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF
THE STATUTES
TC Heartland and Cray temporarily relieve the forum shopping
problem, but their reasoning is contrary to both the text and the legislative
history of the two statutes. As explained below, the legislative history shows
that the predecessor of § 1400(b) was broader than the contemporary general
venue requirement, and hence provided patent owners more venue options
than other federal civil plaintiffs. 78 In the past seventy years, Congress
continuously liberalized the general venue requirement for non-patent
plaintiffs and expressed its intent to synchronize the patent venue statute with
the general venue statute by revising the statutory text of § 1391(c).79 But the
Court continually held that Congress never changed the meaning of §
1400(b) because, allegedly, (1) the statute was originally intended to be
independent of § 1391(c), and (2) Congress never changed its mind. 80
Because of this freeze on § 1400(b) by the Court, now patent plaintiffs have
fewer venue options than their peers who were not restrained by the venue
requirement under the current general venue statute. This section will argue
that, although the § 1400(b)’s predecessor was intended to be independent,
Congress has expressed its changing mind in its revision of the statute.
A. The First Prong of § 1400(b), Fourco, and TC Heartland
The Supreme Court addressed § 1400(b) and its predecessor three times
in history. The first time, in Stonite, the Court concluded that § 1400(b)’s
predecessor was independent of the predecessor of § 1391(c).81 This Article
does not dispute this part of Stonite but disagrees with the following Fourco
and TC Heartland cases, which held that the definition of “residence” in §
1391(c), after being re-codified in 1948, still did not apply to § 1400(b).82 As
explained below, the plain text of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) runs counter to
Fourco and TC Heartland. What’s more, the Supreme Court
miscomprehended the legislative intent underlying the 1948 re-codification,
the 1988 amendment, and the 2011 amendment.
A plain reading of § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) shows that the latter should
control the former. It has been a consensus among courts that, to interpret a

78. See infra Part II, Section B.
79. See infra Part IV.
80. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1957); TC Heartland
LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017).
81. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942).
82. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 228–29; TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21.
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statute, a court should look at its text first.83 Current § 1400(b) reads: “[a]ny
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”84 Most of
this sentence is clear except the terms (1) “resides” and (2) “regular and
established place of business.” If we only look at the plain text of § 1391(c),
it apparently supplements the definition of “residence”:
For all venue purposes . . . (2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be
sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not
incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff,
only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of
business.85

§ 1391(a) also delineates the applicability of this section: “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law . . . this section shall govern the venue of all civil
actions brought in district courts of the United States . . . .” 86
Despite this textual clarity, the Fourco and TC Heartland Courts
reached contrary conclusions based on its own precedents, its interpretation
of legislative history, and short phrases like “except as otherwise provided
by law.”87 The first time the Supreme Court addressed this question was in
Stonite where the Court concluded that the predecessor of § 1400(b), as
originally enacted, was independent of the predecessor of § 1391(c).88 After
Congress re-codified the predecessors of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) to their
current formats, Justice Whittaker, in Fourco, stated again for the court that
the definition of “reside” in § 1391(c) did not apply to § 1400(b).89 Although
Congress had explicitly stated that the re-codified statutes themselves were
determinative and referenced to prior volumes of the statute at large became

83. Justice Elena Kagan, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Interview at
Harvard Law School the Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes
(Nov. 18, 2015) (“we are all textualists now.”), see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal scholarship highlight:
Justice
Scalia’s
textualist
legacy,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/ (“It is
now generally agreed that when interpreting a statute, a court should start by reading the statutory text
and should not lightly depart from the text.”).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2011).
87. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1521.
88. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942).
89. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1957).
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wholly unnecessary,90 Justice Whittaker still cited to the prior Stonite case
and claimed that the question was “whether there has been a substantive
change in that statute since the Stonite case.” 91 The potential substantive
change happened in 1948 when Congress substituted the term “of which the
defendant is an inhabitant” in § 1400(b)’s predecessor with the term “where
the defendant resides“.92 At the same time, Congress similarly substituted
the term “whereof he is an inhabitant” in § 1391(c)’s predecessor with the
word “reside”.93 The re-codified § 1391(c) further defined “residence” for a
corporate defendant as “any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business.”94
Referring to a Reviser Note accompanying the § 1400(b) bill, the
Fourco Court held that these two simultaneous changes of the term did not
mean that Congress intended § 1391(c) to complement § 1400(b).95 The §
1400(b) Note stated: “Words in subsection (b) ‘where the defendant resides’
were substituted for ‘of which the defendant is an inhabitant.’ Words
‘inhabitant’ and ‘resident,’ as respects venue, are synonymous.”96 In other
words, under the interpretation of Fourco, the substitution within § 1400(b)
did not change the meaning of the statute: for patent venue purpose,
“residence” of a corporation was still the judicial district where the defendant
was incorporated.97
However, whether the § 1400(b) Note indeed supported the Court’s
conclusion was questionable in light of another Reviser Note regarding §
1391(c). The § 1391(c) Note similarly stated the “Word ‘reside’ was
substituted for ‘whereof he is an inhabitant’ for clarity inasmuch as
‘“inhabitant’” and ‘“resident’” are synonymous.”98 If the Court’s conclusion
in Fourco was correct, the meaning of § 1391(c) should also be the same
before and after the 1948 recodification. Nevertheless, the recodification
indisputably redefined the meaning of “reside” in § 1391(c). Therefore, the
§ 1400(b) Note cannot preclude the possibility that the 1948 recodification
changed the meaning of § 1400(b). The Note explained why Congress did
90. S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1 (1948).
91. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 225.
92. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400, 62 Stat. 869, 936 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) (2019)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A130-31 (1947).
93. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A127 (1947).
94. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A147 (1947).
95. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227–28.
96. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A130-31.
97. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 226.
98. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A127.
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not directly redefine the term “inhabitant” but instead changed the term
“inhabitant” to “resident” and then defined “resident.” The Court’s reliance
on this Reviser Note was misplaced.
The Fourco court also mistakenly relied on a statement of a special
consultant on this revision at the House hearing: “Venue provisions have not
been altered by the revision.”99 According to the Court, this statement also
supported the conclusion that the simultaneous linguistic substitution within
§ 1400(b) and § 1391(c) did not change the meaning of § 1400(b). 100
However, this quotation pointed only to § 1391(c). This revision
unquestionably changed the definition of “residency” for corporate
defendants in § 1391(c). In the past, corporations “inhabited” only in the
districts where they were incorporated101. After the revision, corporations
resided in any judicial districts where they were incorporated, were licensed
to do business, and were doing business.102 This change of definition was
actually “radical”, the special consultant concluding in his book published
later.103 However, practically, the legal effect of the § 1391(c)’s predecessor
and § 1391(c) for general civil litigations were the same before and after the
revision. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., the Court held that
corporations waived their venue objection when they designated an agent to
accept service to obtain license to do business in a state.104 § 1391(c) codified
Neirbo into the statute by redefining the term “reside/inhabit” to include
judicial districts where defendants were licensed to do business. Although
having the same legal effect, § 1391(c) was still different from § 1391(c)’s
predecessor in two aspects. First, the waiver doctrine was a judicially created
doctrine, but the new definition was a positive law. Second, waiving an
objection was different from not having such an objection in the first place.
In these two aspects, the revision indeed changed § 1391(c). The change in
the definition of the term “residence” changed the effect of § 1400(b), even
though it had no practical effect on § 1391(c) because of the Neirbo case.
If Fourco itself was a mistake, it casts TC Heartland’s reliance on
Fourco in great doubt. Even if Fourco was correct, TC Heartland’s analysis
about changes made to § 1391(c) after Fourco was also wrong. Contrary to
99. Revising, Codifying, and Enacting into Law Title 28 of the United States Code, Entitled
“Judicial Code and Judiciary”: Hearing on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055 Before the Subcomm. No. 1. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., at 29 (1947) (statement of James William Moore, Professor of
Law, Yale University); Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227.
100. Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 227.
101. See Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1892).
102. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)).
103. JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 194 (1949).
104. 308 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1939).
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the Court’s opinion, Congress had clearly expressed its intent to overturn
Fourco in the 1988 revision of § 1391(c), and the alleged “saving clause”
does not save Fourco.
TC Heartland relied on an interpretation canon that Congress can only
overturn the Court’s interpretation by clear expression in the revised
provision. 105 The canon itself is valid, but the Court’s application was
problematic. To correctly apply this canon, the Court should look at all
changes made to § 1391(c) after Fourco. So long as Congress expressed its
intent to overturn Fourco once, it does not need to repeat its intent every
time. The Court refused to find such expression in the current 2011 version
of § 1391(c) but forgot to examine the 1988 revision to § 1391(c). 106
Congress added the phrase “for purposes of venue under this chapter” in the
1988 revision of § 1391(c), and the phrase was a clear enough expression of
intent to overturn Fourco.107 There were only a few venue provisions under
the same chapter as § 1391(c), and § 1400(b) was one of them. By adding
such a phrase, Congress must have considered whether § 1391(c) should
control § 1400(b) and determined it was. If such a phrase is not a clear
enough expression, what is? Congress should not have to explicitly name a
wrongfully decided case in a revised provision of law. The fact that Congress
changed such a phrase to “for all venue purposes” later in 2011 is immaterial.
The saving clause “except as otherwise provided by law,” which was
added in the 2011 revision, does not save Fourco.108 When Congress last
amended § 1391(c) in 2011, observers all believed that VE Holding was the
controlling law, which already held that § 1391(c) supplemented the
definition of “residence” in § 1400(b).109 Therefore, when Congress added
the saving clause, it did not have Fourco in mind.
B. The Second Prong of § 1400(b), Stonite, and Cray
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit misunderstood the
legislative purpose of § 1400(b) and its predecessor. Their purpose was
originally to provide patent owners more venue options, even more than what
other civil plaintiffs had. In Cray, the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme
Court’s instruction in Stonite that the predecessor of § 1400(b) was “a
105. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017).
106. Id.
107. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat.
4642, 4669 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011).
109. Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping and Patent Law—A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 141, 152 (2017).
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restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue [the 1789 statute]” and
interpreted the second prong of § 1400(b) “restrictively.” 110 As a result,
according to Judge Lourie, the phrase “regular and established place of
business” textually requires that the defendant must have a physical presence
in a judicial district to establish venue for patent infringement cases. 111
However, Stonite itself mistakenly interpreted the legislative history of §
1400(b), and the Cray interpretation was not as textualist as what the Federal
Circuit claimed it to be.
Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, the predecessor of § 1400(b) served
the objective of enlarging another prior, narrower venue statute (the 1887
statute), which most courts chose to apply to patent infringement cases over
the “prior, broader venue” (the 1789 statute). 112 As Representative Lacey
explained at the Committee meeting, this statute provided an additional
option for patent owners other than the existing law.113 This aspect of history
has been ignored for a long time.114 The Supreme Court’s misunderstanding
was rooted in the debate at the House. To persuade opponents of the bill,
who did not want to give patent owners more venue options, Congressmen
Mitchell raised the argument that the bill was more limiting than the 1789
statute, which allegedly half of the lower courts applied.115 However, only a
few lower courts applied the 1789 statute to patent infringement cases.116
Most lower courts applied the 1887 statute to such cases, and the bill was
less limiting than the 1887 statute.117 Further, this argument did not convince
the opponent legislators, and hence it did not indicate the legislative intent.118
The key dispute between the opponents, represented by Representative
Sereno E. Payne of New York, and the proponents, represented by
Representative John F. Lacey of Iowa and Representative John M. Mitchell
of New York, was why Congress needed to enact a statute that was less
limiting than the 1887 statute which governed general civil plaintiffs. 119
Representative Mitchell first argued that there was a lower court conflict
about whether the 1789 statute or the 1887 statute should govern patent
110. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
111. Id. at 1362.
112. Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 556–58
(1973) (pointing out and explaining briefly why the § 1400(b)’s legislators might have assumed that the
1887 Act was controlling).
113. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–02 (1897).
114. Wydick, supra note 112, at 556–58.
115. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–01 (1897).
116. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
117. See id.; infra note 127 and accompanying text.
118. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
119. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900–02 (1897).
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infringement cases in the late eighteenth centuries. 120 This uncertainty
allegedly justified a specific patent venue statute:
Conflicting decisions have even arisen in the different districts in the same
States as to the construction of these acts of 1887 and 1888, and there is
great uncertainty throughout the country as to whether or not the act of
1887 as amended by the act of 1888 applied to patent cases at all. 121

However, certainty is only a partial justification for the bill as enacted.
As Representative Payne aptly pointed out, Congress could solve this
uncertainty by simply saying that the 1887 statute controlled in patent
infringement cases.122 “In order to get rid of these conflicting decisions it
would not be necessary to go further [less limiting] than that,” said
Representative Payne.123
In reaching its conclusion that the statute was intended to be a
“restrictive measure,” the Stonite Court mistakenly relied on a second
argument made by Representative Mitchell. However, the second argument
did not persuade Congress either and hence did not embody the legislative
purpose of Congress.124 Representative Mitchell argued that, although less
limiting than the 1887 statute, the bill was more limiting than the 1789
statute, which a lot of lower courts held controlling in patent infringement
cases.125 Compared with the 1789 statute, the proposed statute was narrower
because simply being able to be found in a district, which is sufficient to
establish venue under the 1789 statute, was insufficient to establish venue
under the proposed bill. 126 Compared with the 1887 statute, on the other
hand, the proposed patent-specific statute was broader for it additionally
allowed patent owners to bring suit in the district where the defendant
committed infringement and had a regular and established place of

120. See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (holding that the 1887 Act “is inapplicable to an
alien or a foreign corporation sued here, and especially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right”);
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1895) (interpreting Hohorst’s rationale as (1) it
involved foreign defendant, and (2) jurisdiction to hear patent case was exclusive to federal courts, and
the general venue statute controlled only those federal case with concurrent state jurisdiction).
121. 29 CONG. REC. 1,900 (1897).
122. Id. at 1901.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Compare Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (2011)) with Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) (2019)).
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business. 127 However, Representative Payne was not convinced by the
limiting argument either.128
In fact, Representative Mitchell exaggerated the severity of the split. In
the list proffered by Representative Mitchell to show how severe the split
was, if we carefully examine it, we see that twelve decisions held that the
1887 statute applied to patent infringement cases, and only four decisions
held the 1789 statute controlling.129 Therefore, the bill provided more venue
freedom to patent owners in most lower courts. In Stonite, the Court ignored
these twelve cases holding that the 1887 statute applied to patent
infringement cases and heavily relied on the limiting argument made by
Representative Mitchell.130 The Court cited the only five cases holding the
1789 statute applicable and opined: “[t]hereafter the lower federal courts, for
the most part, took the position that the Act of 1887 as amended did not apply
to suits for patent infringement and that infringers could be sued wherever
they could be found.”131 As explained above, this misstated the fact.
As Professor Wydick correctly concluded, the real legislative intent of
§ 1400(b)’s predecessor was to provide patent owners with more forum
options. Scholars believe that the argument which successfully persuades
objectors indicates the actual “congressional intent.” 132 In the case of §
1400(b)’s predecessor, such argument took place when Representative
Mitchell yielded to Representative Lacey who argued more
straightforwardly why patent owners deserve more venue options:
We have now a law by which, if an insurance company shall have agency
and transact business in some other State, jurisdiction may be had in regard
to business growing out of the transaction of that agency; and so as to
carriers performing service in any State and having permanent place of
business there, they may be sued there. There is no reason why as broad a
jurisdiction should not be had in cases of patents, if infringer opens up a
permanent place of business—commence their business at that place. Why
not give the court the jurisdiction to try that case where the individual
resides, where the witnesses are?. . .Because of this necessity arose we
have this bill. Very frequently an infringing agency is the principal place
of business. When the party defendant who nominally infringes the patent
127. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)) with Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019)).
128. 29 CONG. REC. 1,901–02 (1897).
129. Id. at 1901.
130. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565–67 (1942).
131. Id. at 565 n.4.
132. “Last act” before major compromise, i.e. cloture, is a strong indication of Congressional intent.
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122
YALE L.J. 70, 98–109, 118–28 (2012).
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in one place, but the real place where the business is carried is at another,
at present, the place of the defendant’s residence alone gives jurisdiction
. . . [T]o deprive the court of [Northwest] of jurisdiction would work
hardship by reason of the expense that would cause of having to take
depositions or transport witnesses a thousand miles in the trial of a case.
Why not have the trial where the transaction occurs? The jurisdiction
under this bill only applies to the permanent place of business, or where
the business is in existence.133

In fact, Representative Lacey introduced the bill because several patent
owners in the Northwest complained that they had to travel to where the
defendant was incorporated to obtain relief. 134 Finally, this eloquent
argument convinced Representative Payne, and Congress passed the bill.135
Therefore, this Article concurs with Professor Wydick that the Supreme
Court was wrong when it concluded in Stonite that the bill was to limit a
prior, broader venue statute. As explained above, it was to provide patent
owners with more venue options. As Senator Platt summarized at the Senate,
“[a]ll there is about this bill is that it [additionally] authorizes suit to be
brought against an infringer in the place where the business is carried on and
service to be made upon an agent in the case of a corporation.” 136
Accordingly, the interpreting approach adopted in Cray was also misplaced.
If we, as the Federal Circuit taught in Cray, “be mindful of this history in
applying the statute,” we should not interpret § 1400(b) as a “restrictive
measure.”
Although nowadays patent owners do not deserve more protection than
non-patent plaintiffs, they do not deserve any less. In 1897, inventors in the
Midwest area (then Northwestern area) gradually obtained a fair number of
patents.137 Corporations incorporated in the East Coast manufactured their
products in the Midwest, and some of them infringed those patents owned
by Midwest inventors. 138 Because of the 1887 venue statute, Midwest
inventors could not sue the Eastern infringers in Midwest cities. Instead, they
had to travel to the Eastern states to ask for a relief.139 As a result, since
transportation cost was high at that time, the cost of taking depositions and
transporting witnesses was very burdensome for patent owners. 140 They
133. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897); Wydick, supra note 112, at 555 (understanding the debate as that
Representative Lacey corrected Representative Mitchell’s mistake).
134. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897).
135. Id.
136. 29 CONG. REC. 2,719 (1897).
137. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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wanted to change this inconvenient situation, so the § 1400(b)’s predecessor
ensued. The statute had a solid rationale at the time of enactment. It provided
patent owners more venue options than other non-patent plaintiffs because
patent infringement could arise more remotely from defendants than other
claims more commonly found in the nineteenth century, and it was unfair to
let the plaintiff bear all the costs to travel. In the last century, more and more
corporations expanded to a national scope. Interstate claims are not unique
to patent infringement cases anymore. To alleviate plaintiffs’ economic
burdens, as summarized below, Congress continuously liberalized the venue
requirement for general plaintiffs. Congress did not simultaneously loosen
the venue requirement for patent owners, at least not directly. And the Court,
on the other hand, kept rejecting the arguments that Congress indirectly
liberalized patent venue requirement. As a result, nowadays, patent owners
have less venue options than non-patent plaintiffs. Since patent infringement
claims are not unique anymore, patent owners do not deserve more venue
freedom than they used to. However, they do not deserve any less than nonpatent plaintiffs. Therefore, even if we do not consider the original legislative
intent underlying § 1400(b), interpreting it as a “restrictive measure” still
does not make sense.
What’s more, a textualist reading of the phrase “regular and established
place of business” in the second prong of § 1400(b) does not dictate a
“physical place” requirement. An area where a defendant conducts extensive
business should be able to meet what the second prong textually required. In
Cray, Judge Lourie held that the word “place” in the second prong of §
1400(b) requires that the defendant must have a “physical place” in a judicial
district.141 Though in The Century Dictionary the word “place” indeed has
the meaning “[a] building or a part of a building set apart for any purpose”
or “quarters of any kind,” it also has other meanings like “an area or portion
of land marked off or regarded as marked off, or separated from the rest, as
by occupancy, use, or character.”142 Similarly, in the Webster’s A Complete
Dictionary of the English Language, the word “place” also has the meaning
“any portion of space regarded as distinct from all other space, as related to
any other portion, or as appropriate to some definitive object or use.”143 In
Cray, Judge Lourie cited the language of Representative Lacey and opined
that “[j]urisdiction would not be conferred by ‘[i]solated cases of

141. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
142. Id. (citing Place, WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, 732 (Benjamin E.
Smith ed. 1911).
143. Place, NOAH WEBSTER, ’A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 544
(Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter rev. ed. 1872).
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infringement’ but ‘only where a permanent agency is established.’” 144
However, the whole sentence was, “The jurisdiction under this bill only
applies to the permanent place of business, or where the business is in
existence.” 145 Therefore, in this sense, a “place of business” does not
necessarily require a physical house or building. An area where a “business
is in existence” should be sufficient to meet the second prong of § 1400(b).
III. THE COURT SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING A MOVE AS
DRASTIC AS TC HEARTLAND WHEN ALL VENUE REFORM BILLS FAILED AT
CONGRESS
Though legally contrary to both the text and the legislative history of §
1400(b) and § 1391(c), TC Heartland and Cray aimed at a convincing policy
objective: solving the forum shopping problem that happened at the Eastern
District of Texas. 146 This policy objective is a theme mentioned in the
Petitioner’s brief, and most amicus briefs supporting the Petitioner, in TC
Heartland.147 During the oral argument, Justice Stephen Breyer remarked
that he was surprised with all of the policy arguments unconnected to the
case before the Court.148 Professor Anderson pointed out that the Court was
acting as a “release valve” when Congress cannot reach an agreement, and
the Federal Circuit does not solve a problem.149
However, at the same time, the Court should be cautious about making
a move as drastic as TC Heartland and Cray, especially when all venue
reform bills failed at Congress. The Court institutionally lacks not only the
authority to do so but also the capacity to conduct a comprehensive policy
consideration. Even if the forum shopping problem became extraordinary,
the Court should have narrowly tailored its holding to alleviate the problem
for the sake of prudence. As explained below, the Court overstepped in TC
Heartland and Cray. As Professor Chien testified at a congressional hearing
after TC Heartland, if the pre-TC Heartland rules were plaintiff-friendly, the

144. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1361 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
145. 29 CONG. REC. 1,902 (1897) (emphasis added).
146. J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in A “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of
Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1613–14 (2018).
147. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 14, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341); Brief for National Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
149. Anderson, supra note 146, at 1608–09.
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post-Heartland rules could be considered defendant-friendly, with equity
perhaps lying somewhere in between.150
TC Heartland and Cray were so drastic that now the patent venue
requirement is more restrictive than those bills that failed in Congress. For
example, the first prong of the failed Patent Reform Act of 2006, 2007, and
2009 and the Patents Depend on Quality Act would have allowed patent
venue in at least the judicial districts where the defendant has a principal
place of business or is incorporated, which is more lenient than only where
the defendant is incorporated, as required by TC Heartland.151 The Patent
Reform Act of 2005, 2007, and 2009 and the VENUE Act would have even
provided patent owners with their home court when certain requirements are
met. 152 Nevertheless, these bills were all rejected as “too limiting.”
Obviously, Congress is not yet ready for embracing a venue reform as drastic
as TC Heartland and Cray.
IV. TIGHTENING THE PATENT VENUE REQUIREMENT IS AGAINST THE
TREND OF LIBERALIZING VENUE REQUIREMENT
TC Heartland and Cray re-impose an independent venue requirement
on patent owners, which is contrary to a seventy-year-long legislative trend
of liberalizing the venue requirement.
The doctrine of venue was a common law doctrine that originated from
England.153 Because jurors needed to judge cases based on their personal
knowledge about the case, a venue near where the cause of action arose was
necessary.154 Gradually, the role of jurors transitioned to adjudicator of cases
based on facts presented.155 At the same time, the underlying policy goal of
venue became providing a convenient forum to both the plaintiffs and

150. Examining the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 8–11 (2017)
(statement of Colleen Chien, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law).
151. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Aug. 3,
2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24, 2008);
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009); Patents
Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. §7 (2006).
152. Lamar Smith, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 § 9, at 56-57,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/AmendedSmithBill.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2019); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as reported in the Senate, Jan. 24, 2008); Patent Reform
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 3, 2009); Venue Equity and NonUniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
153. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1163–64
(2014).
154. Id. at 1162–63.
155. Id. at 1163.
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defendants. 156 In the modern era, Congress is the institution determining
which venue is convenient to parties of a litigation.157 It has revised the venue
statutes several times in the past century since the statutes’ enactment, partly
because modern corporations operate more widely.158
In 1789, Congress enacted the first general venue statute under which
venue was proper in any judicial district where the defendant inhabited or
where the defendant “shall be found.”159 In 1887, Congress eliminated the
federal question venue in districts where the defendant “shall be found.”160
As the result, under the 1887 Judicial Act, venue was proper only in the
judicial district where the defendant was incorporated.161
Since then, Congress started a trend to liberalize the general venue
requirement, and its direction never turned back. In 1948, Congress replaced
the 1887 venue statute with § 1391(c), which substituted the word “whereof
he is an inhabitant” with the word “where all defendants reside” and defined
“residence” for a corporate defendant as “any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business.” 162 The
consensus was that the “‘doing business”‘ standard significantly expanded
corporate venue. 163 However, the courts applied different standards in
determining what constituted “doing business.”164 Some of them equated the
standard with the “minimum contacts test” under International Shoe v. State
of Washington, partly because the 14th Amendment had already injected the
“convenience” element into the jurisdictional analysis, which originally was
concerned about the limit of the court’s adjudication power.165 Some other
courts rejected such approach and held that venue required more than
satisfying the jurisdictional requirement.166
Congress has also expressed its intent to synchronize the patent venue
statute with the liberalized general venue statute. In 1988, Congress
legislatively adopted the “jurisdictional test” approach and completely
156. Id.
157. E. Lawrence Vincent, Defining ‘Doing Business’ to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 153, 154 (1986).
158. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204 (1966).
159. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(2011)).
160. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)).
161. Id.
162. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (2011)).
163. Vincent, supra note 157, at 160.
164. Id.
165. Markowitz & Nash, supra note 153, at 1205–07; Vincent, supra note 157, at 160–65.
166. Vincent, supra note 157, at 165–68.
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collapsed the general venue statute into the personal jurisdiction
requirement.167 Under the 1988 Amendment, § 1391(c) defined corporate
“residence” as “any judicial district in which the corporate defendant would
be subject to personal jurisdiction, under the minimum contacts test, if that
district were a separate state unto itself.” 168 According to the text of this
statute, this definition held for venue purposes under the same chapter of the
United States Code. The last amendment to § 1391(c) happened in 2011.169
Then, Congress expanded the application of this definition of “residence” to
“venue of all civil actions” “except as otherwise provided by law.”170 This
held for “all venue purposes,” instead of only venue under Chapter 28.171 As
explained above, patent owners do not deserve any less protection than other
civil plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court should be cautious when it continuously
limits patent owners’ venue options.
V. EQUALIZING COURTS, INSTEAD OF RESHUFFLING DOCKETS: VENUE IS
NOT THE CURE
“The easiest way to reduce forum shopping would be to unwind the
conditions that enable it: a multitude of potential forums from which litigants
may choose and the ability of district courts to differentiate themselves from
one another in terms of potential benefits they can offer,” as stated by
Professor Chien and Associate Dean Risch.172
Although venue reform can eliminate the Eastern District of Texas
problem quicker,173 it is a painkiller with many side effects. If the venue
reform is going to be narrowly tailored to the Eastern District of Texas, one
of the other district courts left open will be the next destination for patent
owners.174 Courts competing with each other to attract patent dockets, by
providing procedural benefits to patent owners, is a phenomenon which has
repeated many times in our history.175 Ultimately, plaintiffs will still forum

167. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
168. Thomas W. Adams, The 1988 Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): Corporate Venue Is Now
Equivalent to In Personam Jurisdiction Effects on Civil Actions for Patent Infringement, 39 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 357, 363 (1991).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM.
U. L. REV. 1027, 1058 (2017) (quoting Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue,
77 MD. L. REV. 46 (2017) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6)).
173. Id. at 1058–59.
174. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 659–67 (2015).
175. Id. at 636.
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shop for the most plaintiff-friendly district court.176 If the venue reform is
going to be sweeping, it will also have many side effects. For example, after
TC Heartland, the District of Delaware has become the district court with
most patent infringement filings.177 The District of Delaware is unlikely to
become a pro-plaintiff venue because Delaware certainly does not want to
deter companies away from being incorporated in the State, and the District
of Delaware, though a federal court, will be influenced by the communities’
attitude, just like the Eastern District of Texas.178 For the same reason, it is
very possible that the District of Delaware is going to be a very prodefendant venue, which designs procedures unfair to patent owners. This
will be contrary to the venue requirement’s goal: achieving a balance
between plaintiffs’’ and defendant’s’ interests. It is never a one-sided
consideration.
These side effects are because of one reason: the underlying
consideration of the venue statutes is a convenience to plaintiff and
defendant, not eliminating forum shopping.179 As the Court once remarked:
“the venue provisions are designed, not to keep suits out of the federal courts,
but merely to allocate suits to the most appropriate . . . forum.”180 Therefore,
although a statute can restrict venue freedom of plaintiffs and thereby
alleviate the forum shopping problem, it cannot eliminate the problem
completely. At the same time, a venue reform wanting to alleviate forum
shopping by excluding certain federal courts will inevitably sacrifice the
fairness of venue to either plaintiff or defendant, the core purpose of it.
The availability of multiple forums for plaintiffs does not cause forum
shopping, differences in those forums do. 181 The real cause of forum
shopping is the differences in patent trial procedure amongst district
courts. 182 Patent local rules and judges standing orders make the forum
shopping problem more severe in the patent world than in other fields of law.
Professor Gollwitzer aptly summarized in his article the difference among

176. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue,
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999).
177. Byrd, supra note 68.
178. Anderson, supra note 146, at 1611–12.
179. Vincent, supra note 157, at 154.
180. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 (1972).
181. Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of A Salesman? Forum Shopping and
Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 775–76 (1995).
182. See, e.g., Adam S. Baldridge, Venue Considerations for Patent Infringement Cases, ASPATORE,
2013 WL 574397, at *1 (Jan. 2013) (“[W]hether a district court has adopted patent local rules is a
significant consideration for a patent holder in determining the best venue in which to file a patent
infringement action.”).
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patent local rules and standing orders adopted by district court judges,183 and
Professor La Belle further explained in her article how the procedural
difference endangers the uniformity of both procedural and substantive
patent law.184 In other areas of law, differences in substantive law and juror
population are the two most common incentives for forum shopping.
Compared to other areas of law, substantive patent law is more unified due
to the single Court of Appeal—the Federal Circuit. Therefore, the fact that
forum shopping problem is much more serious in the patent world is counterintuitive. Only local patent rules adopted by district courts can account for
such a phenomenon. As explained below, because different courts’ local
patent rules differ substantially, the benefit of forum shopping is much more
significant in patent litigation. For example, most plaintiffs choose the
Eastern District of Texas for its local procedure, which makes it easy for
plaintiffs to get a settlement. Professor Love and Professor Yoon
summarized existing explanations for why plaintiffs like filing their cases in
this district, including the judges’ relative quick pace at this venue, the proplaintiff judges and jurors, and local patent rules advantages for patent
owners. 185 After examining litigation data, they concluded that “the
patentees suing in East Texas benefit from the district’s combination of early,
broad discovery deadlines with late action on motions to transfer, motions
for summary judgment, and claim construction.”186 Because attorney’s fees
accrue at an earlier stage in the Eastern District of Texas than in other district
courts, defendants have more incentive to settle the case.187 In other words,
a liberal venue statute only contributes to the forum shopping problem for
not prohibiting it. If patentees cannot enjoy procedural advantage from
picking certain district courts, there is no need to impose on the venue statute
the burdensome goal of keeping suits out from certain courts, 188 which will
obstruct its original purpose.
Congress purposefully facilitated the adoption of these different local
patent rules via the Civil Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”), which granted
district courts’ power to adopt their own local patent rules and standing
orders.189 The starting point of the proliferation of local patent rules was
183. Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local Patent Rules—Certainty and Efficiency or a Crazy Quilt of
Substantive Law?, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 94 (2012).
184. Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 95–109 (2015).
185. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the
Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13–23 (2017).
186. Id. at 34.
187. Id.
188. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Cameron & Johnson, supra note 181, at 775–
76.
189. La Belle, supra note 184, at 80.
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around 1990 when Congress enacted CJRA which encouraged
experimentation of local rules at the district court level. 190 Before CJRA,
although there were also numerous local rules authorized by Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 11, 16, 26, 83, the public criticized them for harming
uniformity which the FRCP tried to achieve and were disfavored by
Congress.191 The CJRA signified Congress’ changed attitude towards local
rules because reducing costs and eliminating delay in civil litigation became
Congress’ priority.192
Now, almost all district courts have adopted their own versions of local
patent rules and standing orders. As a result of CJRA, the Northern District
of California became the first district court with its own local patent rules in
2000.193 The rules include claim construction procedure, infringement, and
validity contention requirements, mandatory disclosure requirements, and
discovery and other procedural matters.194 Since then, thirty-two percent of
all federal district court have adopted their own local patent rules.195 Besides
these officially adopted local patent rules, individual judges also adopted
their own standing orders to streamline their procedures for patent cases.196
For example, in the District of Delaware, which does not have officially
adopted local patent rules, four judges have their own versions of standing
orders.197 In the Northern District of California, although it has officially
adopted its local patent rules, six of the twenty-three judges have their own
individualized standing orders.198
These local patent rules and standing orders are in great variance. Some
of them mandate different pleading standards; some of them give longer or
more extensive discovery; some of them require earlier deadlines for
infringement and validity contentions; some of them restrict the number of
terms subjected to claim construction; some of them require parties to stick
to their infringement and defensive theories; some of them demand earlier
disclosure of damage models; some of them schedule trial earlier than others;
and some have unique jury instructions.199

190. Id.
191. Id. at 79.
192. Id. at 80.
193. Id. at 81–82.
194. Id. at 87.
195. Antonio DiNizo, Krafting TC Heartland: A Legislative Response to Venue Shopping, 100 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 24, 43 (2018).
196. La Belle, supra note 184, at 89.
197. Id. at 89–90.
198. Id. at 91.
199. Id. at 88–92.
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These variances have a strong influence on parties’ litigation strategy.
For example, in the Eastern District of Texas, its local rules require earlier
disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions.200 Plaintiffs have an
abundance of time to collect the necessary information, but defendants only
have limited time to search for prior art references. Judge Davis of the
Eastern District of Texas has described this potential effect of patent local
rules on litigants’ strategies:
While the Court will not comment on Plaintiff’s strategy, when combined
with the requirements of the Patent Rules and the Court’s standard docket
control order, Plaintiff’s strategy presents Defendants with a Hobson’s
choice: spend more than the settlement range on discovery, or settle for
what amounts to cost of defense, regardless of whether a Defendant
believes it has a legitimate defense.201

Thus, plaintiffs looking for quick settlements may be enticed to file their
patent suits in districts that allow significant discovery early in the case.
Contrary to the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of California
is a court with pro-defendant local patent rules. It requires patent owners to
“compare an accused product to its patents on a claim by claim, element by
element basis for at least one of each defendant’s products.”202 “To make
such a comparison, [a plaintiff must put forth information so specific that]
‘either reverse engineering or its equivalent is required.’” 203 Noncompliance of these rules will result in limited infringement theories.204 This
explains why defendants always try to transfer their cases to the Northern
District of California. Although VE Holding was criticized forcefully, only
on rare occasions, have these patent local rules been challenged.205 In those
occasions, the Federal Circuit has consistently upheld them as a proper
exercise of the trial court’s case-management discretion under CJRA, partly
because of some advantages provided by patent local rules.206
Local patent rules have many advantages over not having any patent
procedure rules, but a uniform Federal Rule of Patent Procedure is better in
all aspects and can avoid many unintended effects including forum shopping.

200. Id. at 100.
201. Parallel Networks LLC v. AEO, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-00111-LED, slip op. at 6–7 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
15, 2011).
202. See Renesas Tech. Corp. v. Nanya Tech. Corp., No. C03-05709JFHRL, 2004 WL 2600466, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2004).
203. Id.
204. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
205. La Belle, supra note 184, at 78–79.
206. Id.
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Professor Nguyen argued that local patent rules are top-down efforts to curb
patent abuse and streamline patent cases, providing a more efficient
procedure and predictable timetable for litigants.207 Judge Radar also stated
that a set of announced and dependable procedural rules that all parties
understand in advance, is beneficial.208 However, firstly, it is questionable
whether local patent rules successfully curb patent abuse especially in the
Eastern District of Texas. Secondly, a set of well-enacted uniform patent
procedures can also achieve the alleged efficiency and predictability.
Predictability can be achieved so long as there is a set of announced patent
procedures, and efficiency can be better achieved by analyzing statistic data.
We should keep in mind that CJRA granted district courts the authority to
adopt their own local rules for a reason, which is to experiment different
rules and collect data for enacting a better set of uniform rules. Since 2000,
nineteen years have elapsed. Congress and the Judicial system have obtained
enough data to enact a more efficient uniform patent trial procedure, which
can bring patent litigation back to its ideal uniformity and get to the root of
forum shopping.209
Enacting Federal Rules of Patent Procedure will be a large project, but
not an unprecedented one. Congress and the Court have promulgated district
court procedural rules with similar scope in other areas of law. For example,
Bankruptcy courts have their own trial procedures different from the
standard Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in pleading standards, motion
procedures, and other requirements.210 This Article leaves the question open
about what the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure should look like, as this is
a complicated question and there is a lack of academic literature concerning
this subject. However, the baseline is, as Professor La Belle suggested, that
legislatures should survey opinions from judges, practitioners, litigants, law
professors, industry representatives, and economists when enacting such
rules. 211 Also, the enactment should take into account unique aspects of
patent law, like claim construction and complicated technologies.

207. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 472–80
(2010).
208. C.J. Randall R. Rader, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fed. Cir., The State of Patent Litigation,
Speech at the E.D. Tex. Judicial Conference 7 (Sept. 27, 2011) (transcript available at
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/09/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf) (“[O]ur courts need to understand
that these complex and demanding patent cases profit from an announced and dependable set of
procedural rules that all parties understand in advance.”).
209. See
generally
U.S.
COURTS,
CIVIL
JUSTICE
REFORM
ACT
REPORTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/civil-justice-reform-act-report.
210. See e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008, 9013.
211. La Belle, supra note 184, at 121–24.

TC HEARTLAND3. MA CKJIP FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

TC HEARTLAND, A LEGALLY WRONG PAINKILLER

5/30/2019 8:25 PM

395

CONCLUSION
Although many commentators applauded the Supreme Court’s decision
in TC Heartland and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray for addressing
the forum shopping problem, these decisions are contrary to both the text
and the legislative history of the general venue statute § 1391(c) and the
patent venue statute § 1400(b). Further, the Court should be cautious about
making such drastic moves, especially when more lenient venue reform bills
failed in Congress and when Congress has continuously liberalized venue
requirement for general civil plaintiffs.
Compared to venue reform, enacting a new Federal Rules of Patent
Procedure is a more direct solution for the forum shopping problem. Venue
statutes concern the convenience and fairness to plaintiffs and defendants
and hence are never a good tool to fix the real problem: local rules unfair to
plaintiffs. Now is the time to harvest the fruit from the “local rules
experimentation” and promulgate Federal Rules of Patent Procedure.

